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I. INTRODUCTION
The sudden, increased practice of screening employees for pos-
sible drug use has given rise to substantial controversy surrounding
the issue. There are many competing interests at stake. Many em-
ployers feel that a drug screening program will increase productivity
among their workers and will safeguard the work environment. On
the other hand, many employees feel that such a procedure is an
unreasonable invasion of privacy and therefore should be prohibited
by law. Employees are also concerned about the validity and reli-
ability of such tests in that results may be inaccurate and a positive
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1
Lubic: Drug Testing in the Workplace: Sacrificing Fundamental Rights in
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
test might not always indicate that an employee is impaired on the
job.'
Private employees are not provided the same legal protection as
public employees. The constitutional guarantees of this country ap-
ply only to governmental actions and are therefore implicated in
drug testing programs for both federal and state employees. Em-
ployees in the private sector, however, are not afforded the same
constitutional protection; therefore, although they may have the same
grievances about drug testing as public employees, private employees
are not granted the same protection under federal law.
On September 15, 1986, former President Ronald Reagan issued
Executive Order 12564, which required that all Federal employees
within the executive branch holding "sensitive" job positions be
tested for illegal drug use.2 One goal was to provide an example for
the private workforce to follow. 3 Now, hundreds of private em-
ployers, including about one-fourth of the Fortune 500 companies,
have initiated testing programs to combat illicit drug use. 4
Since government implementation, several drug testing programs
have been challenged in the lower courts on the theory that such
programs should be prohibited by the fourth amendment's protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures. Recently, two circuit
court cases which resulted in a split of authority on the subject were
decided by the Supreme Court. The cases are National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab5 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Ex-
ecutives" Association.6 Although the facts of each differed, both
cases involved a governmental scheme to test employees for drug
use. In each, the Court effectively determined that a public interest
was at stake and, accordingly, held such an interest to be more
compelling than that of an individual's right to privacy. The holdings
in these most recent cases demonstrate a willingness on the Court's
1. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LAB. L.J. 42, 43 (1985).
2. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986).
3. 22 WEEKLY Comp,. PREs. Doc. 1041 (Aug. 4, 1986).
4. Chapman, The Ruckus over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at 58.
5. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
6. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
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behalf to limit the extent of an individual's right to be secure in his
person from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by
the fourth amendment.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASES
National Treasury Employees Union v. Van Raab7 involved a
suit brought by the National Treasury Employees Union against the
Commissioner of the United States Customs Service to prevent the
implementation of a drug testing program. The program was de-
signed to screen for drug use employees seeking promotion to certain
"sensitive" positions. The program would require urinalysis tests
from Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to positions
having a direct involvement in drug interdiction, requiring the carry-
ing of a firearm, or involving the handling of "classified" material.8
Customs employees who tested positive for drugs and could not offer
satisfactory explanations would be dismissed from the Service. 9
However, the results would not be provided to any other agency,
including criminal prosecutors, without the employee's written per-
mission. 10 Petitioners, a union of federal employees and a union
official, sought an injunction and challenged the constitutionality of
the program. The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana granted the petition for injunctive and declaratory
relief, stating that "the drug testing plan constitutes an overly in-
trusive policy of searches and seizures without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, in violation of legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy."' 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
vacated the district court's injunction and held, inter alia, that the
drug testing program was reasonable and therefore constitutional.12
The appellate court decided that the objectives of the Service in
implementing a drug screening program were justified because of
the government's interest in ensuring the integrity of the Service.13
7. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384.
8. Id. at 1388.
9. Id. at 1389.
10. Id.
11. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D. La. 1986).
12. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
13. Id. at 178.
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The court stated that employees who use drugs may seriously frus-
trate the Service's efforts to enforce the drug laws because employees
with drug habits are more susceptible to bribery, are tempted to
divert illegal drug shipments for their own use, and may endanger
the safety of others, as well as themselves, when they are impaired
in their job performance. 14 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
Court affirmed that part of the Fifth Circuit's judgment which up-
held the testing of employees directly involved in drug interdiction
or those required to carry firearms, but vacated the judgment to
the extent that it upheld the testing of applicants for positions in-
volving the handling of classified materials. 15
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,16 respon-
dents, the Railway Labor Executives' Association and various mem-
ber labor organizations, challenged the constitutionality of Federal
Railroad Administration regulations requiring employees to submit
to blood and urine tests after certain train accidents, incidents, and
rule violations. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California granted summary judgment in petitioners' fa-
vor. 17 The court held that although railroad employees deserve pro-
tection against bodily intrusions under the fourth amendment, this
interest is outweighed by the government's interest in promoting
safety in railway transportation. 18 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the district court's ruling.' 9 The court held that drug
tests which are administered without a reasonable suspicion that the
tests will reveal evidence of current drug or alcohol impairment are
unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. 20 The Supreme Court,
after granting certiorari, held that such tests are in fact reasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment and accordingly re-
versed.2 '
14. Id.
15. Von Raab, 109 s. Ct. at 1390.
16. Skinner, 109 S. Ctj 1402.
17. Id. at 1410.
18. Id.
19. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub norm.,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
20. Id.
21. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422.
[Vol. 911070
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III. PRIOR LAw
A. The Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause .... ,"22 The purpose of the fourth amendment is
to "protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted in-
trusion by the State." 23 The drafters of the fourth amendment rec-
ognized that in certain places and at certain times an individual has
a legitimate expectation to be left alone. 24 This expectation of pri-
vacy, though, depends on what society considers reasonable. 5 Sub-
jective expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or "illegitimate"
receive no protection. 26
B. Application of Search and Seizure to Drug Testing
If the government infringes upon a "reasonable" right, a search
has occurred.2 7 If the government "meaningfully" interferes with an
individual's liberty or possessory interest, a seizure has occurred.28
For all purposes, any drug test that is administered by analyzing
one's blood or urine is, at minimum, a search because one's bodily
fluids are personal in nature and the individual should have the right
to dispose or withhold these fluids as he or she sees fit.29
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966).
24. Id. at 758; See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
25. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 338 (1985) and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
26. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338; See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Hudson, 468
U.S. 517.
27. Jacobson, 466 U.S. at 113.
28. Id.
29. Whether or not a seizure occurs during a drug test is unresolved because it is difficult to
perceive blood or urine as being "seized" from one's possession. This issue, though, has no bearing
on the constitutionality of drug testing if such testing has already been determined to be a search.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (The court held blood-alcohol testing a fourth
amendment search and seizure); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (fimgernail scrapings); McDonald
v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 112, 1127 (D. Iowa 1985), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987);
see also Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
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C. Reasonableness of a Search as Defined by the Warrant
Clause
The fourth amendment only protects the individual from searches
and seizures that are unreasonable. 0 In United States v. United States
District Court,31 the Supreme Court said, "[t]hough the Fourth
Amendment speaks broadly of 'unreasonable searches and seizures',
the definition of reasonableness turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the 'warrant clause' . . . [that] no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause. ' 3 2 Accordingly, a search con-
ducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable. 3
D. Warrantless Searches Requiring Probable Cause
The Court has been willing to ignore the warrant requirement
when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search ' 3 4 or when the imposition
of a warrant would conflict with the routine conduct of business
and would not serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement.35 Nev-
ertheless, "[iln enforcing the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon
probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search
permitted by the Constitution.' '36 Therefore, "a search, even one
that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant, must be
based upon 'probable cause' to believe that a violation of the law
has occurred. ' 37
E. Reducing the Standard of Probable Cause
In the past, the Court has relied on its review of criminal cases
in order to determine the correct application of the fourth amend-
30. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.
31. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1971).
32. Id. at 315.
33. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
34. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967).
35. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987).
36. Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1973) (quoting Chamber v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (White, J., concurring)).
37. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340; See Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 62-66 (1968).
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ment.38 Where an employee's right to privacy is concerned, a lesser
standard should not be applied "[b]ecause the individual's interest
in privacy and personal security 'suffers whether the government's
motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches
of other statutory or regulatory standards."' 39 Furthermore, "it would
be 'anomalous to say that the individual . . . [i]s fully protected
by the Fourth Amendment only when [he] is suspected of criminal
behavior. '"40
However, the Court has been willing to forego the warrant and
probable cause requirements where the search or seizure at issue
constitutes a limited intrusion. 41 "We do not say, of course, that a
seizure can never be justified on less than probable cause. We have
held that it can where, for example, the seizure is minimally intrusive
and operational necessities render it the only practicable means of
detecting certain types of crime. "42 Yet the Court has also said that
even a "limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of
privacy." 43
Terry v. Ohio44 was one of the first cases in which the Court
reduced the minimum standard for a reasonable search from "prob-
able cause" to "reasonable suspicion" where the search was only
minimally intrusive. There, a detective suspected three men of "cas-
ing a job" when two men were observed walking back and forth
in front of a store window and conferring with a third man a couple
of blocks away. 4 The officer approached the three men, identified
38. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 109 (1984); Ybarra v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 85 (1979);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 429 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 266 (1973);
Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. (1968); Schmerber, 384
U.S. 757; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
39. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978)).
40. Id. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 530).
41. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (fixed check points where driver and passengers
were questioned); Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (frisk consisting of a limited search of outer clothing); See also
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (Court recently observed that an exception to the probable
cause standard is justified only where government conduct at issue is minimally intrusive); Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Carroll, 267 U.S. 132.
42. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326.
43. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
44. Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
45. Id. at 6.
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himself as a policeman and asked for their names, whereupon he
conducted a frisk consisting of a limited search of their outer cloth-
ing and found that two of the men had loaded guns. 46 Both suspects
were charged with carrying concealed weapons.47 The Supreme Court
upheld their conviction on the theory that the search was reasonable
under circumstances warranting an immediate danger, regardless of
whether there was probable cause or absolute certainty to believe
that the individuals were armed.4 The Court rested its decision mainly
on the experienced officer's reasonable belief that the men were
armed and the fact that the search was minimally intrusive. 49 The
Court said that in order to test the reasonableness of a search one
must consider "whether the action [is] justified at its inception,"
and is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which [jus-
tify] the interference in the first place."50
In New Jersey v. T.L.O. 1 where a student's purse and locker
were subjected to a search based on less than probable cause, the
Court relied on the Terry doctrine in its decision upholding the con-
stitutionality of the search. The Court held that when there are rea-
sonable grounds for suspecting that an inspection will produce
evidence of misconduct, then a search is "justified at its incep-
tion."' 52 If the manner in which a search is conducted is "reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of . . . the nature of the infraction," then a search is per-
missible in its scope.5 3 Accordingly, because the search in question
was found to be reasonable under the Terry test, the Court held
that it did not violate the fourth amendment.5 4
In O'Connor v. Ortega5 5 the Court held that a public employer
could inspect an employee's office, desk, or file cabinet without a
46. Id. at 6-7.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 20-27.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 20.
51. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
52. Id. at 342.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 347-48.
55. O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709.
[Vol. 911074
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss4/9
WORKPLACE DRUG TESTING
warrant or probable cause; but this search was viewed as a "'rel-
atively limited invasion' of employee privacy." 56 Thus, under certain
conditions, the Constitution allows a limited search where the facts
do not constitute probable cause.5 7 Because of the governmental in-
terest at stake, such minimum intrusion is reasonable under circum-
stances that provoke suspicion.58
Still, the Court has recognized that intrusions into the human
body implicate the "most personal and deep-rooted expectations of
privacy ' 5 9 and therefore require a "discerning inquiry into the facts
and circumstances to determine whether the intrusion [is] justifia-
ble." 6" Such an inquiry should consider whether there is reason to
suspect that the search will turn up evidence of misconduct. On the
other hand, while "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usu-
ally a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. . . the Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of suspicion.' '61
Hence, "where a careful balancing of governmental and private in-
terests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable
cause, [the Court has] not hesitated to adopt such a standard." 62
Many lower courts, though, have not measured the constitu-
tionality of drug testing programs upon the existence of any such
standard, i.e., minimum suspicion; instead, by simply balancing the
interests involved, they have judged whether such tests were "un-
reasonable" under the circumstances.6 1
In one lower court case, Jones v. McKenzie, 4 the appellee chal-
lenged a mandatory drug testing program initiated by the District
56. Id. at 725 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 537).
57. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
58. Id.
59. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539; cf., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946).
60. Winston, 470 U.S. at 760; see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68.
61. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61.
62. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
63. See, e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 672 F.
Supp. 779, 785-86 (D.N.J. 1987); McDowell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987); Jones
v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Lovorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 879
(E.D. Tenn. 1986); Cupua, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1520.
64. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335.
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of Columbia School System for employees in its Transportation
Branch. The district court enjoined the program because it was ad-
ministered without "probable cause." 6 On appeal, the question pre-
sented before the District of Columbia Circuit Court was whether
a school district could administer any drug test without probable
cause. 66 However, the court failed to address the probable cause issue
(although it did acknowledge evidence of drug abuse in the Trans-
portation Branch) and instead relied strictly on the Terry test to
determine whether the search was reasonable under the circum-
stances.6 7 The court concluded that such a test, administered by a
school system, is not unreasonable where: a) the purpose is to ensure
the physical safety of young school children, b) the testing is con-
ducted as part of a routine medical examination, and c) the test has
a nexus to the employer's legitimate concern about safety. 68
It would seem then, in this court's opinion, that a balancing test
is all that is required to determine the reasonableness of a search;
but "the Framers of the [Fourth] Amendment balanced the interests
involved and decided that a [search or] seizure is reasonable only
if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause." ' 69 Al-
though that initial standard may now be reduced to what is described
as "reasonable suspicion," even that "does not disappear merely
because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions
in its capacity as an employer.' '70
Only after probable cause or reasonable suspicion is established
should a balancing test be applied to determine whether the search
is reasonable. "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amend-
ment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.
In each ease it requires a balancing of the need for a particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search en-
tails."71 To determine the standard of reasonableness one must "bal-
65. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
66. McKenzie, 833 F.2d at 339.
67. Id. at 338-39.
68. Id. at 341.
69. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
70. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717-18 (quoting Scalia, J., concurring at 731).
71. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1970).
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ance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.''72
F. Closely Regulated Industry Exception to the Probable Cause
Requirement
When the government inspects a closely regulated industry it is
excepted from the probable cause requirement, or any lesser stan-
dard. "Certain industries have such a history of government over-
sight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for a
proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise. ' 73 "[T]he appro-
priate standard for administrative searches is not probable cause in
its traditional meaning. Insfead, an administrative warrant can be
obtained if there is a showing that reasonable legislative or admin-
istrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied." 74
Hence, the traditional warrant and probable cause standards are
lowered in this context because any expectation of privacy is limited
in a "closely regulated" industry where the risk of danger is inherent
by the nature of the industry.7"
"In situations of 'special need' where privacy interests of the
owner are weakened and government interests in regulating partic-
ular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspec-
tion of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the Fourth
Amendment.' '76 Needless to say, "pervasively regulated" businesses
long subject to close supervision and inspection are excepted from
the warrant clause.7 7 The only distinction is that in traditional closely
regulated industry cases the government has been allowed to inspect
property, not persons. On the other hand, where the government
has been allowed to search persons without adherence to the warrant
clause, such invasions were held minimally intrusive. Therefore, when
the government embarks upon a major intrusion into the lives of
72. Place, 462 U.S. at 703.
73. Marshall, 436 U.S. 307, 314.
74. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 723; see Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320; Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
75. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987).
76. Id.
77. U.S. v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
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employees in a closely regulated industry by administering a drug
testing program, conflicting standards of case law become appli-
cable. In Shoemaker v. Handel,78 though, the Third Circuit had no
problem in upholding the random testing of racehorse jockeys on
the basis of the "pervasively regulated industry" doctrine. The court
merely reasoned that jockeys had reduced expectations of privacy
in such a closely regulated business because they knew that the New
Jersey Racing Commission had a strong interest in assuring public
confidence in the integrity of the industry. 79
G. Consent
Another exception to the requirements of both a warrant and
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.8 0
There are certain limitations, however.
When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify
a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and
not the result of duress or coercion, expressed or implied. Voluntariness is a
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances .... 11
"Consent" may apply to federal drug testing programs because
the employee knows of the drug test in advance.82 But in a recent
District of Columbia court case, National Federation of Federal Em-
ployees v. Weinberger,83 the court said that "[a] search otherwise
unreasonable cannot be redeemed by a public employer's exaction
of a 'consent' to the search as a condition of employment. ' 84 The
court went on to say that "[a]dvance notice of the employer's con-
dition, however, may be taken into account as one of the factors
relevant to the extent of the employees' legitimate expectations of
privacy."5
78. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
79. Id. at 1142.
80. See Martinez-Fuere, 482 U.S. 543.
81. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 248-49.
83. National Federation of Federal Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 943.
85. Id.
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IV. PRACTICAL INTERESTS CONCERNING DRUG TESTING IN THE
WORKPLACE
A. Competing Interests Between Employers and Employees
According to one source, in 1986 alone drug abuse cost this
country over $70 billion in lost worker production. 6 It has also been
reported that between five and twenty-five percent of the workers
in this country have some form of alcohol or other drug abuse
problem.87 Statistics show that approximately four million Ameri-
cans use cocaine, and at least twenty million Americans use mari-
juana or hashish. 88 It is not surprising, then, that many employers
have decided to test their employees for drug use.
Employers that favor drug testing assert that impairment on the
job results in poor job performance and may cause more accidents
to occur, and that drug use in general causes increased absenteeism,
employee theft for the purpose of supporting expensive drug habits,
and the buying, selling and possession of drugs in the workplace.8 9
Therefore, in light of all the foreseeable risks that are connected to
drug use, many employers perceive drug testing as a necessary means
to prevent such harms from occurring in the workplace.
Employees, on the other hAnd, may resent being tested, even if
they do not use drugs.90 The experience is both humiliating and
degrading, especially for a candidate who has never evoked suspicion
of drug use.91 Employees are also concerned about the validity and
reliability of the test results,92 and the fact that such tests may reveal
physiological secrets beyond the question of whether the employee
is an illicit drug user.93
86. Willard, Toward a Drug-Free Workplace, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 74 (1987).
87. Comment, Constitutional Law: The Fourth Amendment and Drug Testing in the Workplace,
10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 762, 763 (1987).
88. Comment, "Drug Testing of Government Employees Should Not Be a Matter of Fourth
Amendment Concern" Cries a Lone Voice in A Wilderness of Opposition, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1239
(1987).
89. Castro, Battling the Energy Within: Companies Fight to Drive Illegal Drugs Out of the
Workplace, Tim, Mar. 17, 1986, at 53.
90. Chapman, The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, FoRTuNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at 59.
91. Neal, Mandatory Drug Testing: Court Weights Civil Liberties Objections, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1, 1988, at 63.
92. Chapman, supra note 90 at 57-59.
93. In National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), the court said:
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B. Test Accuracy
Presently there are three basic methods for detecting drug use
through biochemical urinalysis: 1) the enzyme multiplied immuno-
assay (EMIT) and the radioimmunoassay tests (RIA), 2) the gas
chromatography test (GC), and 3) the mass spectrometer test (MS). 94
Each test requires the operation of different testing equipment, but
the premise underlying each test is the same: drugs that are inhaled
or ingested are chemically broken down by the body into metab-
olites, which are detected in urine samples. 95
Claims have been made that a urine sample will react positively
for a whole array of substances ranging from legal prescription and
over-the-counter drugs to certain foods. 96 Experts in the drug testing
field, though, regard the testing procedures as highly accurate when
supervised by qualified and trained personnel. 97 Generally speaking,
drug tests are estimated to be at least ninety-eight percent accurate,
and, if confirmed by follow-up tests, the results are considered vir-
tually one hundred percent accurate. 98 These estimates, however, do
not account for tampering or mishandling of test samples, or for
"false positives" which indicate a person is taking a drug when they
really are not. Such results arise from the cross-reaction of known
or unknown compounds.9 Also, any procedure performed by man
is bound to be subject to human error. Under former President
Reagan's proposed plan, over one million federal employees in "sen-
sitive" job positions would be tested for drug use.' °° If the tests are
Urine testing may disclose not only the presence of drug traces but much additional in-
formation about an employee whether the employee is under treatment for depression or
epilepsy, suffering from diabetes, or, in the case of a female, pregnant. Even tests limited
to the detection of controlled substances will reveal the use of medications prescribed for
relief of pain or other medical symptoms.
Id. at 175-76.
94. Rector, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace: A Proposal for Federal
Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1014 (1986).
95. Id.
96. Randall, Drug Testing for Illegal Substance, (Congressional Research Service Report For
Congress, January 20, 1987, at 5) (available in the Library of Congress).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 6.
100. Id. at 1.
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merely one percent inaccurate, roughly 10,000 employees could be
falsely accused of using illegal drugs.
C. Reliability
Finally, although a drug test may determine that a person has
taken illegal drugs, a positive test indicates only the presence of drug
residue; it does not show that an individual is impaired in his or
her job performance. 0' Such tests are also highly sensitive. 10 2 Ap-
parently, some tests can detect usage after two weeks of abstinence,
and may even register positive results for a person who merely
breathes marijuana smoke. 03 Accordingly, positive test results do
not indicate a proper nexus between an employee's drug use and its
effect on his job related activities.
V. ANALYsis
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Van Raab, °4 the issue
before the Court was whether or not the United States Customs
Service's requirement of a urinalysis test for employees seeking
transfer or promotion to certain positions violates the employees'
fourth amendment rights.
The Court first determined that the drug testing program im-
plemented by the Service was indeed a search under the fourth
amendment because the urinalysis test infringed upon an employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy. 0 5 The Court then discussed.
whether the program complied with the fourth amendment's rea-
sonableness standard. The Court recognized that the reasonableness
standard is met when a search is supported by a warrant which is
issued upon probable cause, but insisted that "neither a warrant nor
probable cause, nor indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion,
is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circum-
stance."1 06
101. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LAB. L.J. 42, 48 (1985).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384. The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy.
105. Id. at 1390.
106. Id.
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[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary
to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests
to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of in-
dividualized suspicion in the particular context.1'°
The Court further explained how a drug testing program, de-
signed to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sen-
sitive positions within the Service, may be administered on the basis
of a special need that justifies a departure from the ordinary warrant
and probable cause requirements.18 In fact, the Court initially sug-
gested that this was simply another case wherein the constitutional
requirements of the fourth amendment could be dispensed with in
order to serve the "important" needs of government.
The Court considered the warrant requirement unnecessary for
the Service's drug testing program because such a requirement "would
serve only to divert valuable agency resources from the Service's
primary mission[,] . . .[which] would be compromised if [warrants
were required] in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment
decisions. 19 Furthermore, because the surrounding circumstances and
the permissible limits of such intrusions are narrowly and specifically
defined, the Court stated that a warrant would provide little or no
additional protection of personal privacy."0 The Court reasoned that
employees know in advance whether or not they will be tested and
are aware of the procedures that the Service must follow."' Ad-
ditionally, the Court noted that such tests are not subject to the
discretion of officials in the field." 2 Thus, the Court reasoned that
there are not any special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate,
since such testing becomes automatic when an employee applies for
a covered position."3
The Court's reasoning at this stage of its opinion is seriously
flawed. Such is the case because the issuance of a warrant generally
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1390-91.
109. Id. at 1391.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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requires that it be based upon probable cause. The Court, however,
made no mention of the normal requirement of probable cause in
the early stages of its opinion. Rather, the Court stated superficially
that "a warrant serves primarily to advise the citizen that an in-
trusion is authorized by law and limited in its permissible scope. ' 114
Although this statement is correct, it does not consider the fact that
probable cause must first be established in order for a warrant to
be valid. Therefore, regardless of whether there are any "special
facts" involved in a government search, a neutral magistrate may
not issue a warrant in the first place unless it is based upon probable
cause. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that a warrant is not always
required in connection with a "routine, yet sensitive" employment
decision. 15 Such broad language suggests that the government's au-
thority to conduct warrantless searches upon its employees is without
limit, so long as the warrantless search is part of a conceived plan.
However, the Court did acknowledge that even where a warrant
is not required, a search must ordinarily be based on probable
cause.116 Nonetheless, it explained that the government could dis-
pense with the probable cause requirement in situations that demand
a safeguard against the development of dangerous conditions." 7
Our precedents have settled that, in certain limited circumstances, the Govern-
ment's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their
development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed
by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion."18
In previous cases where the Court has relaxed the probable cause
standard, it was established that the search at issue constituted a
limited intrusion. A drug test, on the other hand, involves a sub-
stantial invasion of privacy. 1 9 Thus, in light of this distinction, the
Service's testing of its employees for drug use should not be justified
without probable cause.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1392.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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The Court reasoned that the government has a compelling in-
terest in ensuring the Service's integrity and preventing the risk of
harm caused to the public by the potential use of deadly force by
employees whose perception and judgment are impaired. 120 The ma-
jority opinion accepted the Commissioner's argument, which con-
tended that drug-using employees may be "unsympathetic to [the
government's] mission of interdicting narcotics;"1 21 accordingly, such
employees might frustrate the Service's efforts to enforce the drug
laws.
A drug user's indifference to the Service's basic mission or, even worse, his active
complicity with the malefactors, can facilitate importation of sizable drug ship-
ments or block apprehension of dangerous criminals.12
Of additional import was the Court's concern that employees who
are required to carry firearms may endanger the safety of others
when they are impaired on their job performance. 23
The aforementioned justifications for screening employees for
drug use were held to outweigh the employees' interests in protecting
their individual privacy. 24 In support of this conclusion, the Court
stated that employees seeking promotion to positions involving drug
interdiction or requiring the incumbent to carry a firearm have a
diminished expectation of privacy in circumstances where the em-
ployees "reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness
and probity."1 25
The petitioners argued that the program is not justified in two
respects: 1) it is not based on a belief that it will uncover evidence
of drug use by covered employees, and 2) its screening function is
ineffective because employees can avoid discovery by temporarily
abstaining from drug use before the test date or by surreptitiously
adultering their urine samples. 26 The Court determined that both
arguments were unpersuasive.127
120. Von Raab, at 1393.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1394.
126. Id. at 1394-95.
127. Id. at 1395.
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In response to petitioners' first argument, the majority claimed
that even though there is little reason to believe that the testing will
reveal much evidence of actual drug use, it is primarily designed to
prevent illegal drug users from being promoted to sensitive posi-
tions.'2 1
Indeed, the almost unique mission of the Service gives the Government a com-
pelling interest in ensuring that many of these covered employees do not use drugs
even off duty, for such use creates risk of bribery and blackmail against which
the Government is entitled to guard. In light of the extraordinary safety and
national security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug users to po-
sitions that require the carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled subst-
ances, the Service's policy of deterring drug users from seeking such promotions
cannot be deemed unreasonable. 29
The Court's argument, however, is equally unpersuasive. Ac-
cording to the dissenting opinion, the Court's argument is "sup-
ported by nothing but speculation, and not very plausible speculation
at that. ' 130
What is absent in the Government's justifications, notably absent, revealingly
absent, and . ..dispositively absent, is the recitation of even a single instance
in which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is,
in which the cause of bribe-taking, or poor aim, or of unsympathetic law en-
forcement, or of compromise of classified information, was drug use.",
The Court simply assumed that drug users were more susceptible to
illegal inducements than non-users. However, the majority proffered
no tangible proof in support of this unfounded assumption.
In response to petitioners' second argument, regarding a user's
ability to avoid detection through abstinence, the Court claimed that
the case was overstated. 13 2
[A]ddicts may be unable to abstain for a limited period of time or be unaware
of the "fade-away effect" of certain drugs. More importantly, the avoidance
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1399 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, Brennan, Scalia and Stevens all dis-
sented in the case. Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined, wrote one dissenting opinion,
and Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Stevens joined, wrote the other. Marshall's dissent, however,
merely refers the reader to his dissent in Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422; therefore, Scalia's dissent will
be referred to as the dissenting opinion in this case.
131. Id. at 1399-1400.
132. Id. at 1396.
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techniques suggested by petitioners are fraught with uncertainty and risks for those
employees who venture to attempt them. A particular employee's pattern of elim-
ination for a given drug cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy, and, in any
event, the information is not likely to be known to the employee.,
The Court's argument is inconsistent; if an addict cannot abstain
from usage for even a short period of time, it stands to reason that
his work performance will be noticeably affected. Thus, a blanket
screening program would not be required to detect usage under these
circumstances.
The petitioners' final suggestion that drug users could adulterate
their urine specimens was also refuted in light of the precautions
taken by the Service to verify the integrity of each sample before
analysis. 134
Thus, the Court concluded that the government's interests in
protecting its borders and the interests in public safety outweigh the
privacy expectations of employees seeking promotion to positions
involving the interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring the incumbent
to carry a firearm. 3 5 Hence, the testing of these employees was held
to be reasonable under the fourth amendment. 36
The Court, however, found the record insufficient for the pur-
pose of deciding whether the Service's testing of those who apply
for promotion to positions where they handle "classified" infor-
mation was reasonable. 137 Employees holding the following titles
would be tested under the Service's scheme: "Accountant," "Ac-
counting Technician," "Animal Caretaker," "Attorney (All),"
"Baggage Clerk," "Co-op Student (All)," "Electric Equipment Re-
pairer," "Mail Clerk/Assistant," and "Messenger.' '138 The Court
felt that the Service had defined this category of employees more
broadly than necessary to meet the purposes of the Commissioner's
directive because it is unclear whether persons occupying those po-
sitions are likely to gain access to sensitive information. 139
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1397.
139. Id.
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Thus, the Court upheld the testing of employees seeking transfer
or promotion to positions that directly involve drug interdiction or
positions which require the incumbent to carry a firearm. However,
the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals in order to
determine which applicants for positions involving the handling of
"classified" materials should reasonably be tested under the Ser-
vice's scheme.140
The dissent stated that the Court was unjustified in its holding
because there was not any evidence which would prove that Customs
employees were using drugs. 141 The Commissioner himself stated that
he believed that the Service was largely drug-free.142 This is evident
from the fact that of the 3,600 employees tested, only five tested
positive for drugs. 143
The dissent concluded that only one reason exists for the majority
holdings in favor of drug testing, but that it was not a reason upon
which the Court was willing to rely. 144 The only plausible expla-
nation, in the dissenters' view, is that the Court submitted to po-
litical pressure, allowing the government to show the world that it
was serious about its "war on drugs.' ' 45 The dissent found this
justification unacceptable. 46
[Tihe impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point
, . . [E]ven symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs,
cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search. 4 7
One of the dissent's leading concerns was that the Court's hold-
ing now approves drug testing for all federal employees having access
to confidential information. 4 Such a realization is frightening, but
the impact of the Court's holding is greater than that. It is inevitable
that many state agencies will now follow suit, as well as private
140. Id. at 1397-98.
141. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1400.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1401.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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employers who have not yet implemented programs of their own.
Soon, the day will come where virtually every employee will be drug-
tested in one way or another; but will employers stop at that? Per-
haps there are other things that an employer would like to find out
about his employees, as well. Now that the drug testing of employees
has become an acceptable intrusion of privacy, one only has to imag-
ine the kind of intrusions which will be acceptable in the future.
Only the test of time will tell.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,'49 the issue
before the Court was whether Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
regulations requiring employees to submit to blood and urine tests
after certain train accidents violate the fourth amendment. Applying
the same principles set forth in Von Raab,150 the Court determined
that the toxicological testing contemplated by the regulations does
not unduly infringe upon the justifiable expectations of privacy of
covered employees.' 5' Therefore, the Court held that the challenged
regulations do not violate the fourth amendment.1 52
The Court determined that the fourth amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to drug tests
implemented by a government-developed regulation. 153 The Court
explained that, ordinarily, a search is unreasonable unless it is sup-
ported by a warrant issued upon probable cause, but that there are
exceptions to this rule in certain limited situations "when 'special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the war-
rant and probable cause requirement impracticable.'" 15 4
When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the gov-
ernmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements in the particular context.155
The Court reasoned that the government's interest in regulating the
conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety justified prohibiting
149. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). Justice Kennedy wrote the decision for the majority.
150. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384.
151. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. Id. at 1421.
152. Id. at 1422.
153. Id. at 1411.
154. Id. at 1414 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, , 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3167 (1987)
(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351)).
155. Id.
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such employees from using alcohol or drugs while on duty. Thus,
the government's interest "present[ed a] 'special need' beyond nor-
mal law enforcement [justifying] a departure from the usual warrant
and probable cause requirements." 5 6
The Court discussed the warrant and probable cause requirement
separately to further justify its "special needs" doctrine. In its dis-
cussion of the warrant requirement, the Court added that such a
requirement might frustrate the purpose behind the government's
objective because alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the
blood stream at a constant rate; thus, the delay necessary to procure
a warrant might result in the destruction of evidence. 57
Having abandoned the warrant requirement, the Court discussed
probable cause. However, the issue was addressed only in terms of
"individualized suspicion," which is normally distinguished as a lesser
standard than that of probable cause. Nevertheless, the Court used
the terms synonymously in its analysis. The Court stated that
[i]n limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search
are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the in-
trusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion,
a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. 15
The Court reasoned that the drug tests contemplated by the FRA
regulations constituted only a limited interference with covered em-
ployees' reasonable expectations of privacy but furthered the gov-
ernment's important interest in ensuring railroad safety. 159 Thus, the
Court held that such testing fell within the limited exception to the
probable cause requirement. 6' This argument, however, is based on
a misconception of the law as established by earlier cases. The ma-
jority relied on language in Schmerber v. California6' which implied
that the intrusion imposed by a blood test is not significant because
"such 'tests are commonplace in these days of periodic physical
examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of
156. Id. (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at , 107 S. Ct. at 3168).
157. Id. at 1416.
158. Id. at 1417.
159. Id. at 1417, 1419.
160. Id. at 1420.
161. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757.
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blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure
involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain."' 16 2 Accordingly, the
Court argued that Schmerber "confirms 'society's judgment that
blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an
individual's privacy and bodily integrity.' ' 163 However, the dissent
focused on the language in Schmerber which recognized the follow-
ing:
[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects
forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be
found, these fundamental human interests require lawoffices to suffer the risk
that such evidence may disappear . . . .
Hence, Schmerber may be appropriately cited for the proposition
that in the absence of at least some particularized suspicion, com-
pulsory blood tests are not permitted under the fourth amendment. 65
The majority's reliance upon specific language contained in Schmer-
ber is unfounded in that the particular language was clearly taken
out of context. 166
The Court has, in decisions subsequent to Schmerber, recognized
that even a limited search of the person "constitutes a severe, though
brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security. ' 167 Therefore, the
majority's assertion that drug tests are minimally intrusive is, ac-
cording to the dissent, "nothing short of startling."'' 6 Compelling
an individual to submit to a drug test upon demand intrudes deeply
on privacy and bodily integrity. Additionally, it should be noted
that such testing will not only uncover drug or alcohol use, but will
also reveal or indicate conditions such as diabetes, epilepsy, and
clinical depression. 6 9 Of additional import are the facts that a pos-
itive test indicates only the presence of drug residue and that a pos-
162. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
163. Id. (quoting Winston, 470 U.S. at 762).
164. Id. at 1427 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70).
165. Id. at 1427-28.
166. Id. at 1428 n.7.
167. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25.
168. Skinner, at 1429 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
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itive test does not measure current impairment. 170 Therefore, drug
testing "'may provide Governmental officials with a periscope
through which they can peer into an individual's behavior in her
private life, even in her home.' '1 7 1
Recognizing that urine tests may reveal nothing more specific
than the recent use of controlled substances, the Court maintained
that such information would provide a basis for further investigation
designed to determine whether or not an employee used drugs at a
particular time. 72 In addition, the FRA relies principally upon the
results of blood tests, which "unquestionably can identify very re-
cent drug use."'' 7 Thus, the Court reasoned that blood and urine
tests, taken together, may provide an effective means of ascertaining
on-the-job impairment.174
The Court further stated that "the expectations of privacy of
covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation
in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal
dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered
employees.' ' 75 The Court also noted that many employees are al-
ready subject to periodic physical examinations. 76 Consequently, the
Court concluded that the testing procedures imposed by the FRA
regulations "pose only limited threats to the justifiable expectations
of privacy of covered employees.' 1 77
The majority's stated line of reasoning is clearly misguided in
light of prior law. Accordingly, the dissent predicted that the ma-
jority had set "a dangerous and ill-conceived precedent.' '7
Our decisions in the regulatory search area refute the suggestion that the heavy
regulation of the railroad industry eclipses workers' rights under the Fourth
170. Susser, supra note 101.
171. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. Id. at 1427 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting McKenzie, 266 U.S. App.
D.C. at 89).
172. Id. at 1421.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1418.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1419.
178. Id. at 1430 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Amendment to insist upon a showing of probable cause when their bodily fluids
have been extracted. This line of cases has exclusively involved searches of em-
ployer property, with respect to which "[c]ertain industries have such a history
of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for
a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise." Never have we intimated that
regulatory searches reduce employees' right of privacy in their persons.1 '9
In light of the government's compelling interests at stake, how-
ever, the majority determined that the "regulatory search" doctrine
was applicable to the present case 80 The Court reasoned that a
substance-impaired railroad employee in a safety-sensitive position
can cause great harm before any signs of the impairment become
noticeable to supervisors or others. Recognizing that no procedure
can accurately identify all impaired employees with ease and perfect
accuracy, the Court concluded that FRA regulations provide an ef-
fective means by which to deter employees from using alcohol or
drugs. 181
The Court explained that an individualized suspicion requirement
regarding drug or alcohol use would serve only to seriously impede
the process of obtaining valuable information about the causes of
accidents, since finding evidence that a particular employee is im-
paired is impracticable in the chaotic aftermath of a serious acci-
dent. 18 2 Accordingly, the Court concluded that a requirement of
individualized suspicion, in these circumstances, would frustrate the
government's goal of ensuring safety in rail transportation.1 83
The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on the importance
of diagnosing the causes of an accident as a critical basis for up-
holding the FRA's plan. 184 The dissenters determined that such re-
liance was unfounded, in light of the Court's frequent admonition
that the interest in determining the causes of a criminal episode does
not justify departure from the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. 8 5 As in Von Raab, the dissenting Justices felt that the ma-
179. Id. at 1429 (emphasis in original).
180. Id. at 1418-19.
181. Id. at 1419.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1420.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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jority's only justification for treating this case differently was that
the majority was apparently "swept away by society's obsession with
stopping the scourge of illegal drugs." 18 6
Nonetheless, the Court based its conclusion on other grounds.
As a result of the limited discretion exercised by the railroad em-
ployers under the regulations, and as a result of the safety interests
served by drug tests in this context, as well as the diminished ex-
pectation of privacy of railroad employees in covered positions, the
Court held that it is reasonable to administer such tests in the ab-
sence of a warrant and in the absence of probable cause. 187 Hence,
the Court concluded that the drug tests contemplated by the FRA
regulations are reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. 8 8
VI. CONCLUSION
It appears that the Von Raab and Skinner decisions are the direct
result of changing times and circumstances. The increasing concern
in safeguarding the workplace as well as the commitment to the war
on drugs serve to support measures such as drug testing in our so-
ciety's attempt to deter drug use. However, Justice Holmes, in a
decision rendered nearly a century ago, expressly cautioned that po-
litical climates not be the primary thrust of judicial decisions. His
age-old wisdom is as applicable to the conservative Court of the
1980's as it was to the Court in 1904. Justice Holmes, in his first
dissenting opinion, had the following words of caution:
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, [but] because
of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic
pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which
even well settled principles of law will bend. 89
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1433.
188. Id. at 1422.
189. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
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Certainly, the issue of drugs is one which is of "immediate over-
whelming interest"' 190 within our society. Nonetheless, the Court has
ignored the wisdom of Holmes cautionary statements in that the
public declaration of war on drugs has ultimately resulted in bending
or attributing doubt to what was once a well-settled principle of
law. That is, the Von Raab and Skinner Court has stripped the
citizenry of one of its most basic and fundamental rights. Clearly,
the fourth amendment expressly provides for protection of an in-
dividual from unreasonable searches and seizures.
That basic right, which lies at the core of the Constitution, has
now been cast in doubt and has been semantically manipulated so
as to dilute an individual's right to privacy, all for the sake of the
political war on drugs.
The majority does not ignore the fourth amendment but does,
in fact, only lend itself to a superficial reading of its express lan-
guage. The Supreme Court stated that the contemplated drug tests
are reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. How-
ever, the meaning attributed to the fourth amendment in Von Raab
and in Skinner is irreconcilable with the express language therein.
For what could be more unreasonable and intrusive than the taking
of an individual's bodily fluids for the purpose of determining drug
usage without any basis of individualized suspicion? As sophisticated
as the arts of science and technology have become, the methods of
drug testing do not measure, let alone detect, degrees of current
impairment. The results of said testing serve only to indicate the
presence of drug residue. Thus, it is scientifically feasible for one
to test positive for illegal drug use, but at the same time not exhibit
any measurable degree of current impairment.
The Skinner majority proffered its holding on the premise or
under the guise that drug testing be permitted so as to protect public
safety. Ironically, though, the majority did not sufficiently address
the well-known fact that drug testing does not, in any concrete man-
ner, measure an individual's impairment. The majority merely pro-
vided that additional liberties could be taken if an individual initially
190. Id.
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tested positive for drug usage. Thus, the Court provided that once
it is established through testing that an individual's bodily fluid con-
tains drug residue, such result would serve as a basis for further
investigatory measures. However, this approach essentially circum-
vents the constitutional requisite of reasonable suspicion prior to the
administration of a governmental search, let alone such an intrusive
measure as drug testing. Certainly, public safety is of importance.
However, the Court should not haphazardly approve the imple-
mentation of patchwork solutions or uncertain remedial measures,
such as drug testing, at the expense of an individual's basic con-
stitutional rights, all for the sake of appeasing the current political
regime.
While the Von Raab Court implied that public safety was the
underlying rationale for its conclusion that drug testing be permitted,
the Justices expressly provided an additional explanation. The ad-
ditional justification cited as outweighing an individual's privacy in-
terest was that of the government's interest in protecting the integrity
of the Customs Service. The express citation and simultaneous rec-
ognition of such an ambiguous interest is alarming. One may easily
concede that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting
the integrity of the Service. However, it is disconcerting to discover
that such an interest has been adjudged by our highest court as being
one which surpasses the right against unwarranted searches and sei-
zures. It is frightening that the majority placed such grave weight
upon the integrity of the Service without regard for the most basic
rights of the government's individual citizenry.
In light of Skinner and Von Raab, it appears that our highly
conservative Supreme Court has, once again, chiseled away at the
fourth amendment. The repeated denial of the express language con-
tained in the fourth amendment has resulted in a vastly different
degree of protection than that which was presumably intended by
its authors. Hence, this writer is convinced that today the fourth
amendment is treated merely as an historical artifact. Its original
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures has been dras-
tically reduced over the past few years.
The infiltration of drugs into our society is a social change
wrought with costs. The costs are great in that the war against drugs
10951989]
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permeates every aspect of our daily lives. Undoubtedly, there are
social, economic and political costs. However, the changing times
and warranted attention on the expansive drug dilemma does not
warrant judicial activism solely as the result of changes in political
climates. Justice Holmes was wise enough to warn the Court about
falling into such traps. But, unfortunately, our current Court was
not inclined to heed his cautionary statements. Consequently, in-
dividuals will no longer be assured of protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures. That is, what was once crystal clear, an
individual's right to protection from unwarranted searches and sei-
zures, has now been made uncertain.
Let us hope that this immediate overwhelming interest in the war
against drugs does not continue to result in the sacrificing of the
fundamental rights of individuals, all for the sake of the whole.
After all, isn't the whole only the sum of its parts?
Bret Lubic
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